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A growing number of studies on the US subprime market indicate that, due to 
asymmetric information, credit risk transfer activities have perverse effects on banks’ 
lending standards. We investigate a large part of the market for securitized assets (“prime 
mortgages”) in Italy, a country with a regulatory framework analogous to the one prevalent 
in Europe. Information on over a million mortgages consists of loan-level variables, 
characteristics of the originating bank and, most importantly, contractual features of the 
securitization deal, including the seniority structure of the ABSs issued by the Special 
Purpose Vehicle and the amount retained by the originator. We borrow a robust way to test 
for the effects of asymmetric information from the empirical contract theory literature 
(Chiappori and Salanié, 2000). Overall, our evidence suggests that banks can effectively 
counter the negative effects of asymmetric information in the securitization market by 
selling less opaque loans, using signaling devices (i.e. retaining a share of the equity tranche 
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1. Introduction
1 
Prior to the financial crisis, securitization was one of the defining features of the 
financial landscape. Banks went from being delegated monitors of borrowers, monitored in 
turn by depositors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), to being essentially underwriters of their 
own loans and investors in other banks’ securitized assets. Securitization was thought to 
have stimulated loan supply, increased the liquidity of banks’ balance sheets, allowed a 
broader range of investors to access a class of assets hitherto limited to banks and, by 
increasing risk diversification, to have improved financial stability (Duffie, 2007). The 
originate-to-distribute (OTD) model was also considered to have helped to satisfy a growing 
demand for safe assets (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009). In fact, in 2006 the volume of 
asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance amounted to around 4 trillion dollars in the United 
States and the European Union, a value comparable to that of gross corporate bond issuance. 
Then, in 2007, the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States and the collapse 
of the subprime mortgage market ignited the most severe global financial crisis since 1929. 
By the end of 2009, banks in the United States and the European Union had to be heavily 
recapitalized with taxpayers’ funds, massive stimulus packages were put in place to avoid a 
repeat of the Great Depression and loud demands were heard for regulatory reform of the 
financial industry. Meanwhile, the market for securitized assets shrank: in 2009, ABS 
issuance plummeted to 1 trillion dollars and was concentrated exclusively in the US agency 
sector and in European securitizations used for refinancing activities with the ECB. The US 
subprime and Alt-A market vanished. Securitization and the new intermediation model were 
blamed for financial instability and for the price paid by the economy (Keys et al., 2010). 
As after 1929, banks are being accused of taking advantage of informational 
asymmetries. Bankers’ greed caused great outrage and, just as after 1929, there are plans to 
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restrict banks’ “proprietary” trading activities (the so-called “Volcker Rule”, which draws on 
the initiatives by the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker and has been 
included in a set of regulations proposed on January 21, 2010 by president Barack Obama to 
Congress) and to re-regulate banks, for instance by increasing capital requirements for 
securitized assets (BCBS, 2009). But is securitization per se really so much to blame and to 
fear? 
The basic issue with securitization is the role of asymmetric information. In particular, 
banks rely on soft information to grant and manage loans. Since this information cannot be 
credibly transmitted to the market when loans are securitized, banks might lack incentives to 
screen borrowers at origination or to keep monitoring them once the lending has been 
securitized (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2007). There 
are also theoretical reasons why new issuance in loan secondary markets might collapse and 
the adverse selection problem might worsen when the collateral values used to secure the 
underlying loan fall (Chari et al, 2010). 
Such perverse incentives would not operate if banks could find ways to overcome or at 
least mitigate the effects of asymmetric information at the moment of securitization.
2 First, 
banks may choose to securitize loans that have a relatively low content of soft information 
(Drucker and Puri, 2007). Second, they might retain a high share of the securitized 
portfolio’s risk by keeping the most junior (equity) tranche as a signaling device of its 
(unobservable) quality or to express a commitment to keep monitoring borrowers. And since 
banks do not resort to securitization as a one-off process but deal with investors on a 
continuing basis, reputational concerns should deter them from selling lemons (Fender and 
Mitchell, 2009). In principle, while trying to burnish their own reputation, they might even 
choose to securitize loans of better-than-average (although unobservable) quality. Similar 
dynamics have been emphasized for banks underwriting securities issued by firms that are 
also their borrowers, as shown by Kroszner and Rajan (1994) for the 1920s and by Gande et 
                                                           
 
2 Note that asymmetric information could produce frictions both i) at the securitization stage and/or in terms 
of suboptimal screening activity at loan origination and ii) after securitization, in terms of suboptimal 
monitoring. While the latter problem is relevant for the implications on financial stability, the former one, 
which is the focus of this paper, is relevant not only to directly evaluate the efficiency of the securitization 
market but also to consider the probability that the second kind of distortions could emerge. In other words, 
based on the theoretical models available, if there were no asymmetric information at the securitization stage, it 9 
al. (1997) for the 1990s. Finally, there are theoretical arguments suggesting that 
securitization is actually optimal from a security design perspective, as it is necessary to 
provide the correct incentives to screen and monitor borrowers.
3 
The impact of securitization on screening/monitoring activity needs to be tested 
empirically. The evidence on the whole supports the thesis that the rise of subprime 
mortgages was accompanied by a decline in lending standards (see Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; 
Mian and Sufi, 2009; Keys et al., 2010; 2011). 
Despite the broadly convincing results supplied by these empirical studies, they have 
certain limitations that could give rise to doubts as to how far they can be generalized to 
other contexts and markets. First, some are based on aggregate data that are ill-suited to 
exploring issues of asymmetric information. Because of limitations in the information set, 
those based on micro data need to make assumptions about the loans that are actually 
securitized. Second, all these papers focus on the US subprime mortgage market, which is 
only a small segment of the credit market (representing less than 10% of all securitized 
mortgages in the U.S., and close to zero in the European Union) and one with very unique 
characteristics. In particular, subprime mortgages are much riskier than other mortgages (by 
definition) and also more information-intensive, since they are granted to borrowers with 
little or no track record. 
In this paper, we set out to investigate banks’ behavior concerning the larger part of 
the market for securitized assets, i.e. prime mortgages. It is worth noting that prime 
mortgages in the Italian market have no government guarantee, unlike the case in the US 
where Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set minimum standards.
4 However, as in the US, the 
class of mortgages we analyze can be considered as low default risk and are typically 
granted to borrowers with good credit records and a monthly income that is at least three to 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
would be less likely the occurrence of misalignment of incentives and dangers for financial stability in a 
second time. 
3 Chiesa and Bhattacharya (2007) argue that the payoff structure under securitization can enhance banks’ 
incentives, compared to debt financing, in environments where, because of the presence of aggregate risk, 
banks would be rewarded too much for luck and too little for their effort. See also Gorton and Souleles (2005), 
for an alternative story based on bankruptcy costs. 
4 For more details on the institutional characteristics of the securitization market in the US see, among 
others, Frame and White (2005) and Krainer and Laderman (2009). 
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four times greater than their monthly housing expenses. In Italy the subprime market 
segment has not been able to develop because an Interministerial Credit Committee 
resolution has fixed the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at 80%. The LTV can exceed 
the 80% and rise as far as 100% of the market value of the house only if additional specific 
guarantees are provided (Casolaro, Gambacorta and Guiso, 2005). 
Moreover, in Italy the supervisory authority has taken a very cautious prudential 
approach on securitization: banks may securitize primarily to facilitate turnover in the loan 
portfolio and to increase funding. From a prudential perspective, when there is no transfer of 
risk through the securitization deal, there is also no benefit in terms of reduction of 
regulatory capital requirements. Finally the Bank of Italy, the Italian supervision authority, 
demands a high level of disclosure in balance sheets on the characteristics of securitization 
deals. All this ensures that the securitization deals we consider here are mainstream 
transactions that concern only prime loans.  
Our sample consists of a unique dataset of about one million household mortgages 
originated by 50 Italian banks in the years 1995–2006. This sample presents important 
advantages over existing studies. First, as already pointed out, it consists of prime 
mortgages, as is the case for most of the market. Second, the richness of information 
contained in the database allows us to control for a wide set of relevant characteristics that 
are not available in existing studies. These include loan-level variables, characteristics of the 
originating bank and, most importantly, contractual features of the securitization deal 
including, in particular, the seniority structure of the securities issued by the special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) and the amounts retained by the originator. 
Our analysis also differs in the methodology used, which in our case is suggested by 
the similarity between the securitization market and the insurance market: both exist to allow 
the transfer of risk across agents. In particular, in order to test for the existence of 
asymmetric information, we use the framework first devised by Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000) for insurance contracts which, applied in the context of mortgage securitization, 
consists in estimating jointly two models: the probability of a loan being involved in a 
securitization deal and its probability of default. The explanatory variables in both equations 
are given by the set of variables which are observable by the “insurer” and which can affect 
one of the two probabilities. The test consists in evaluating the sign and significance of the 11 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations. Loosely speaking, a correlation that 
is significantly positive is evidence that asymmetric information is at work in the 
securitization process. This methodology also helps to corroborate existing findings on the 
quality of households’ mortgages in Italy obtained in Bonaccorsi and Felici (2010) who, 
based on single-equation probit regressions, document that, ex post, securitized loans exhibit 
a lower probability of default (in this last paper, however, no attempt is made at dealing with 
the endogeneity and asymmetric information dimensions of the problem).  
Beyond these methodological aspects, our analysis has several other distinguishing 
features. One is that, as a byproduct of the testing strategy used, we obtain evidence on the 
characteristics of the loans that are securitized, an interesting piece of information. Most 
importantly, we exploit information on the structure of the securitization deals such as: the 
amount of the securities (ABS) issued by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) involved in the 
securitization, and this for each seniority class (junior, mezzanine, senior); the amount that is 
retained by the originating bank; the characteristics of these securities (rating, spread, 
maturity). Thanks to the richness of the dataset we are able to compute and use measures of 
the risk that is actually transferred to the market, which is a crucial element in assessing the 
effects of securitization on screening and monitoring incentives. We also study the pricing of 
these securities by checking if it takes into consideration the possible presence of 
asymmetric information. Overall, this information allows us to produce evidence of the two 
devices adopted to counteract the negative effects of asymmetric information on lending 
standards: signaling through retention of ABS and reputation building. To our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to do so. 
Our main result is a strong rejection of the hypothesis of a positive correlation between 
the error terms of the probability of being securitized and the probability of default. On the 
contrary, such a correlation turns out to be significantly negative, suggesting that banks 
securitize loans that are on average less risky than the ones they keep in their portfolios. 
Consistent with previous findings on how banks deal with such issues, the choice of the 
loans securitized is shown to play a role in overcoming asymmetric information. Beyond 
this, we provide new direct evidence that the structure of the securitization deals is also 
chosen so as to diminish the costs of asymmetric information. None of these factors, 
however, is sufficient to fully capture why we get a negative correlation of the residuals, 12 
rather than a positive one or none at all. One possible interpretation of this result, which is 
robust to changes in the set of control variables and in the econometric setup, is that banks, 
particularly at the early stage of the securitization market life, are strongly committed to 
building up a reputation that will allow them to ensure continued access to this important 
source of funding. This would be consistent with the traditional certification role performed 
by banks, as emphasized by Drucker and Puri (2009), who analyze straight loan sales. We 
provide evidence corroborating this interpretation, by looking at the dynamics of this 
correlation over the sample period. 
The broad policy implication of the paper is that the securitization of prime mortgages 
can function well. The criticism leveled at rating agencies that they have granted undeserved 
investment-grade status to certain types of CDOs or ABS-HEL securities does not 
necessarily hold for “traditional ABS”. The sample analyzed in this paper of “prime 
mortgages” showed a very low risk profile and therefore the OTD model per se cannot be 
blamed for having induced a deterioration in lending standards.
5 These results may also 
depend on the very cautious prudential approach taken by the Italian supervisory authority, 
which demands a high level of disclosure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
securitization and outlines the contribution of our paper. Section 3 discusses the 
characteristics of the dataset and some institutional characteristics of the securitization 
market in Italy. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the results 
and their robustness by using different econometric approaches. The final section 
summarizes the main conclusions. 
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nature. For example, securitization may allow an excess maturity transformation and as such create room for 
the “bank-run” type of crises. Although this is beyond the scope of this paper, it is useful to emphasize that 
there are other factors, beyond the adoption of the OTD model, which may have contributed to the low quality 
of the securitized loans in the United States like, in particular, the government guarantees supplied to the 
government-sponsored agencies (such as the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, 
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respectively) which enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by issuing and guaranteeing, but not originating, asset-
backed securities. 13 
2. Review of the literature on securitization 
Adverse selection and moral hazard in the context of loan sales have been studied from 
different perspectives. Straight loan sales, mostly in the form of loan syndication, reduce the 
risk borne by the originating bank and therefore affect banks’ incentives to screen loans ex 
ante and monitor them ex post. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) present a theoretical model of 
incentive-compatible loan sales and empirically document that banks retain a larger share of 
the riskier loans to mitigate incentive problems. Sufi (2007) shows that the more opaque the 
borrower, the more concentrated the syndicate; Focarelli et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
the more concentrated the syndicate the lower the interest rate investors require. Along 
similar lines, Drucker and Puri (2009) find that sold loans contain more restrictive and 
additional covenants, especially when informational problems are more severe. They also 
find that selling loans does not hamper the lending relationship. This evidence is consistent 
with banks taking into account the role of informational asymmetries and finding ways of 
compensating for it. 
Papers on syndicated loans use loan-level data but a typical deal does not involve 
pooling and tranching (except in some respects for Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995), which are 
the essential features of securitization transactions and define how risk is managed by both 
parties. Furthermore, the buyer knows the identity of the borrower being sold and is able to 
collect relevant information on her; therefore there is less scope for informational 
asymmetries than with an undefined portfolio of assets.  
Benmelech et al. (2011) depart from the previous papers by analyzing collateralized 
loan obligations (CLO), a form of securitization in which the underlying loans are to middle 
sized and large business loans (typically a fraction of syndicated loans). In particular the 
authors investigate whether securitization was associated with risky lending in the corporate 
loan market by examining the performance of individual loans held by CLOs. Interestingly 
they find that adverse selection problems in corporate loan securitization are less severe than 
commonly believed: these loans perform no worse and, on some criteria, even better than 
unsecuritized loans of comparable credit quality. Since securitized loans are typically 
fractions of syndicated loans the authors claim that the mechanism used to align incentives 
in a lending syndicate also reduces adverse selection in the choice of the CLO collateral. 14 
A second strand of the literature examines directly how securitization affects the 
willingness of lenders to bear the cost of monitoring and screening. Keys et al. (2010) 
measure the default rate of a sample of sub-prime loans and find evidence consistent with 
securitization being correlated with lower loan quality. They conclude that securitization is 
accompanied by adverse selection. One important limitation of their study is that they don’t 
observe directly which loans are securitized so they must rely on a number of reasonable and 
smart assumptions on the FICO score to identify the relationship between securitization and 
credit risk. Furthermore, they ignore the differential effects that lender and contract 
characteristics can have on lenders’ behavior. Keys et al. (2011) confirms the finding that 
securitization had an effect on subprime mortgage lenders’ screening standards.  
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2009) show that bank lending standards declined more in areas 
with higher mortgage securitization rates. This does not say much about the specifics of 
securitization deals but it does seem consistent with an impact of securitization on bank 
behavior (moral hazard). Since their dataset is aggregated at the local level, they can’t 
measure the riskiness of individual loans and the behavior of individual lenders. 
Keys et al (2009) also look at securitization and moral hazard. They find that the more 
regulated originators generate loans of higher quality; they interpret this result as an effect of 
the fact that less regulated originators are more highly leveraged and therefore more fragile. 
They also find that “having skin in the game” (keeping a share of the securitized loans) also 
makes for better-quality loans. Their general conclusion is that market incentives reduce 
moral hazard better than regulation. This paper is based on broadly the same data as the ones 
used in the paper mentioned above and suffers from the same limitations. 
Similar comments hold for Mian and Sufi (2007), who infer a causal relationship 
between supply expansion and subsequent increases in mortgage default rates by using US 
zip codes to estimate within-county variation in latent demand for loans before the supply 
expansion occurred. In particular they show that zip codes with higher denial rates as of 
1996 experienced a disproportionate increase in the supply of credit from 2001 to 2005, as 
the risk tolerance of the originators increased. These counties also experienced different 
increases in both debt-to-income ratios and in the fraction of mortgages sold in secondary 
market within one year of origination. Also this paper uses aggregate data that force the 
authors to make crucial assumptions and do not take into account differences among 15 
originators and in securitization contracts. Finally, Krainer and Laderman (2009) use loan-
level data in California to show that loans securitized with public agencies (the so-called 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises) are less risky than those sold to the market through 
private vehicles but the choice of whether to go through GSEs is considered as exogenous. 
The papers on securitization confine themselves mostly to the US subprime market. 
The institutional characteristics of this market are such that it constitutes a very special case 
of securitization, from which it would be difficult to infer general conclusions about other 
segments of the securitization market (i.e. the much larger market for prime mortgages). 
Furthermore, the use of aggregate data forces the authors to make assumptions about the 
most important variable of their studies, i.e. the riskiness of originated loans and its 
evolution after securitization.   
In this paper we unite the two strands of the literature on loan sales by using loan-level 
data with the characteristics of individual borrowers and lenders, as in the work on 
syndicated loans, and by examining deals that involve pooling and tranching as in the papers 
on securitization. Furthermore, we study prime mortgages, which constitute the vast majority 
of loans, and we venture outside the US to check how informational asymmetries play out in 
a country such as Italy with an institutional and regulatory framework similar to what is 
prevalent in the European Union.  
Our database allows us to measure the riskiness of the borrower, to consider how 
certain bank characteristics (in terms for example of risk appetite, or propensity to 
securitize) affect their behavior and to use the information about the securitization deal (for 
example, whether the originator keeps the junior tranche) to understand how contractual 
features might help mitigate information effects. 
We tackle two major challenges to empirical research in this area. The first is the 
endogeneity of the securitization decision. For example, loans that are bundled and sold as 
securities may differ in several dimensions from loans that are not securitized. We mitigate 
this problem by using a research strategy that directly analyzes the likelihood for a loan to be 
securitized or not, based on its individual characteristics. In doing so we are able to identify 
directly, without any arbitrary assumptions, which loans are securitized, to control for their 
individual characteristics and to compare them to non-securitized loans. The second is 
related to data availability on contractual terms, interest rates, characteristics of the seller 16 
and of the transaction when analyzing the effect of informational asymmetries: the lack of 
data generally forces researchers to make at most indirect inference. We overcome this 
limitation thanks to the characteristics of our dataset, whose richness of information is 
extremely relevant in order to analyze the relative importance of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in securitization.  
Since securitization involves a transfer of credit risk and is therefore similar to an 
insurance contract, we use a conceptual and empirical framework first developed for 
insurance contracts (see Section 4) to analyze directly the role of informational asymmetries. 
Therefore we are able to draw firm conclusions about adverse selection and moral hazard in 
the context of securitization. 
3. Some stylized facts on the market for securitization in Italy 
Italy’s asset securitization market developed much later than America’s, originating 
with the introduction of a specific law
6 and the launch of the single European currency.
7 As 
shown in Graph 1, the growth in euro-denominated securitization started in 2000 and 
accelerated strongly from the end of 2004 onwards; at the end of 2006 the annual net flow of 
asset-backed securities issuance in Italy was around one quarter of total securitized assets in 
the euro area. Italian banks securitized mostly mortgages to households and did not engage 
in sub-prime lending. Since the last quarter of 2007 the Italian securitization market has 
remained heavily distressed and almost all the ABS of Italian banks reported in Graph 1 (see 
shaded area) have been self-retained and used as collateral in refinancing operations.
8 
                                                           
 
6 Unlike in the United States and United Kingdom, where a common law system is in place, most 
continental European countries possess a continental law framework under which a specific regulation is 
required to issue asset-backed securities. In this respect, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain had to enact specific laws to remove obstacles to the development of securitisation. On the basis of 
Italian law, all special purpose vehicles need to be registered, to be included in a list, and they must report data 
to the Credit Register. Not all countries have this type of legal context. 
7 The introduction of the euro has given a strong impulse to the corporate bond and securitization markets 
(ECB, 2007). The disappearance of exchange rate risk among euro-area countries, the increase in financial 
integration (Baele et al., 2004) and a more market-based financial system have all contributed to enhancing the 
liquidity and size of the securitization market. As a result, institutional investors increased their cross-country 
exposure while issuers gained access to a broader pool of potential investors. At the same time, increased bank 
competition also helped by lowering underwriters’ and managers’ fees. 
8 Much ABS issuance in Italy (and in the euro area) since the end of 2007 has been related to their use as 
collateral in Eurosystem refinancing operations. According to informal estimates from market participants, 17 
In this paper we analyze about one million mortgages contracts originated by a sample 
of 50 Italian banks over the period 1996-2006 and sold after the introduction of the 
Securitization Law. Around one fifth of these loans have been sold to the market in more 
than 80 securitization deals worth more than 23 billion euro. The sample represents more 
than 80% of bank lending that has been securitized in Italy (see Table 1). 
We have constructed a database that links a number of different sources. From the 
Italian Credit Register we obtain information on the amount lent, the interest rate, the type of 
contract (fixed or adjustable rate, subsidized or not, date and place of origination), the age, 
gender and native town of the borrower. From information derived from the special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) involved, we get information about the actual performance of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
approximately 90% of euro-denominated ABS issued in 2008 seems to have been used as collateral for ECB 
liquidity standing facilities rather than sold to the markets. This percentage is even higher if we consider only 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). 18 
securitized loans and, in particular, whether they have defaulted or not.
9 From the database 
of the Banking Supervision Department of the Bank of Italy we obtain information on each 
securitization deal (book and market values of the loan portfolio, the ratings of the relevant 
ABS and, for each seniority class, how many of these securities are repurchased by the 
originating banks) and most relevant characteristics of the banks. Importantly, for all the 
banks in the sample, we obtain information on all loans originated, including both those 
which are then securitized and those which are not. 
Table 2 presents some statistical information on securitized and unsecuritized 
mortgages considering the main characteristics of the borrower and the lender. Looking 
simply at descriptive statistics the delinquency rate of securitized mortgages is lower (by 
around a third) than other mortgages. This finding does not rule out the hypothesis that the 
securitization market is subject to asymmetric information problems. Precisely because of 
asymmetric information, banks tend to securitize loans with specific characteristics and, in 
particular, those that are less opaque (for instance, we will see that loans to borrowers in 
some Italian regions where the assessment of credit risk is harder are less likely to be 
securitized). As these characteristics may be correlated with risk (borrowers in these regions 
also tend to be riskier), one may observe that securitized loans are less risky, even in the 
presence of asymmetric information. 
The hypothesis that securitized loans tend to be less information-sensitive is supported 
by the other descriptive statistics, with just a few exceptions. A high proportion of 
securitized household mortgages has some form of subsidization in the interest rate (39% 
against 31% for the other mortgages). These mortgages on preferential terms, negotiated 
directly by the borrower’s employer with the bank, are typically granted to civil servants or 
employees in large companies whose credit risk assessment is presumably less difficult. 
Joint mortgages represent more than half of the contracts in the sample. These are home 
loans, secured by real property as with regular mortgages, but granted to more than one 
                                                           
9 We analyze defaulted mortgages up to December 2009. This date should include most of the defaults of 
loans originated in the period 1996-2006. Indeed, data on doubtful loans calculated by the Italian Credit 
Register indicates that repayment difficulties are typically encountered  in the first part of the life of the 
mortgage with a maximum reached after 18 months (Bonaccorsi and Felici, 2010). See also Banco de España 
(2007) for a similar analysis on Spanish mortgages. 
 19 
party. Typically, a joint mortgage is issued to married couples, which choose to apply for a 
single mortgage in order to combine their incomes and qualify for a higher loan amount. 
Joint mortgages imply that both borrowers are liable for repaying the loan. The plurality of 
guarantees attached to these contracts renders soft information less relevant for their credit 
risk assessment.
10 The percentage of joint mortgages is somewhat higher in the group of 
securitized loans.
11 Looking at the location of borrowers, those living in Southern Italy, the 
poorest part of the country, and with weaker legal enforcement, are less often securitized 
(12% against 16% for the whole sample). 
Other descriptive statistics are not strongly in line with the idea that loans securitized 
are less information-sensitive. Around 18% and 16% of contracts have been subscribed 
respectively by borrowers less than 40 years old and by female borrowers. The percentages 
are slightly lower among securitized loans, although these borrowers could be regarded as 
less information-sensitive. Young people are more likely to be without a credit record and so 
no bank can have private information on their default probability, while female borrowers 
have been shown to be significantly more reliable borrowers than men (for the Italian 
market, Alesina et al., 2008). 
Finally, there is a set of characteristics which are not directly related to the level of 
opaqueness of the borrower, but with implications for the level of risk. Fixed interest rate 
mortgages represent 14% of the whole sample, while the vast majority is at variable or semi-
variable rates. Fixed-interest rate loans, which are presumably less risky for the borrower as 
installments stay constant when interest rates rise, are less frequent among securitized loans. 
On the other hand, the difference between the interest rate paid by borrowers and the 
corresponding interest rate on the yield curve for a similar length of the contract (the spread, 
a direct measure of the risk premium charged by the lender) is lower for securitized 
mortgages. The size of the loan is also a proxy of risk, as more highly leveraged borrowers 
are more likely to default. No significant differences emerge across securitized and non-
securitized loans with respect to this variable. 
                                                           
10 This is relevant for Italy but would not be in other contexts, such as the U.S., where mortgages are often 
non-recourse loans (loan contracts where the collateral is the unique source of repayment in case of default, as 
the borrower is not personally liable). 
11 In a similar vein, Drucker and Puri, 2008 document that loans sold in the secondary markets for loans 
contain increasingly restrictive covenants. 20 
The last part of Table 2 shows some characteristics of the banks in the sample, 
measured at the moment of loan origination (in terms of liquidity and capitalization). 
Liquidity (cash plus government bonds) is expressed as a percentage of total assets. The 
degree of capitalization is given by the difference between the level of prudential capital and 
minimum capital requirements (excess capital) over total assets. The literature has 
emphasized that different banks may engage to different extents in the securitization 
activity.
12 In our analysis, banks characteristics are used to allow for the possibility that the 
market infers the quality of the loans securitized also by looking at the features of the 
originating bank. 
The first part of Table 3 gives some basic information on the securitization deals in 
terms of number of originating banks, seniority of the tranches (senior, mezzanine, equity) 
and share of each kind of seniority tranche retained by the originating intermediary. The 
table also highlights other important information on the quality of each operation: the rating 
attached to each securitization tranche, the average maturity of the pool of mortgage 
contracts in each tranche, the share of fixed-term mortgage contracts in each tranche, the 
proportion of mortgages for which the accounting value is lower than the nominal value (a 
measure of how much these have been “discounted” before being bundled and sold). 
The analysis of the deals reveals that most transactions (70 up to 81) were originated 
by a single bank. Some 91% of securitized mortgages is represented by senior tranches with 
a very high rating and a low spread (25 basis points). The mezzanine component is 8% of the 
total, with lower rating and medium-level spreads (73 basis points). The equity tranche is 
limited to 1% of the total and it has a low rating and high average spread (104 basis points). 
Overall 41% of all tranches has an investment grade rating. 
Data also reveal that around two thirds of all equity tranches were directly retained by 
the originating banks (11% for the mezzanine and 4% for the senior components, 
respectively). This seems to be an interesting signaling or commitment device that helps to 
reduce asymmetric information problems between the contractual parties and to align the 
interests and incentives of originators and investors. The average maturity extends from 25 
years for the senior tranche to 34 years for the equity tranche. Almost all these securities are 
                                                           
12 For recent papers see Panetta and Pozzolo (2010) and Affinito (2010). 21 
at variable rate for senior and mezzanine tranches, while there is a non-negligible share 
(13%) of the senior tranches that is fixed-rate. In a very limited number of cases (0.4%) the 
accounting value of the mortgages turns out to be lower than their nominal value, in 
connection with losses of market value of these assets – which is due, for instance, in the 
case of fixed-rate mortgages, to changes in the levels of interest rates.
13 Neglecting these 
features of the deals, which capture the use of screening, monitoring and commitment 
devices, is likely to lead to an underestimation of the importance of asymmetric information. 
At the same time, by comparing the results obtained with and without these control 
variables, we can assess how effective these signaling and monitoring devices may be in 
attenuating the frictions generated by asymmetric information. 
4. The estimation strategy 
4.1  The basic framework 
The methodology we apply to detect the relevance of asymmetric information effects 
is inspired by the similarity between the securitization market and the insurance market, as 
they both transfer risk across agents in the economy. 
The main testable prediction of the theory on asymmetric information applied to 
insurance markets is that, among observationally equivalent agents seeking protection from 
risk, those who choose a more comprehensive coverage are also those characterized by a 
higher accident probability. The methodology proposed to implement this empirical test is 
conducted in two steps (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; for an extensive survey see Chiappori 
et al., 2006). 
The first step of the identification strategy requires estimating jointly, conditioning on 
all available information to the insurer, an equation for the probability of choosing the more 
comprehensive coverage contract and an equation for the probability of an accident. In 
                                                           
13 It has to be kept in mind that we considered only the securitization of performing loans. We basically 
neglected securitizations of bad loans as in these deals issues of asymmetric information can play only a 
marginal role (the default has already been realized). At the same time, changes in the macroeconomic 
environment can induce a revision of the assessment of the default probability, even in the absence of a default. 
In principle, the difference between the accounting value of the mortgages in the SPV balance sheet and their 
nominal value may also partly reflect these considerations. 22 
symbols, denoting Yi a dummy equal to 1 if the insured i chooses the more comprehensive 
coverage contract and 0 otherwise, Zi a dummy equal to 1 if the insured i who has an 
accident i chose the more comprehensive coverage contract and 0 otherwise, Xi  a vector of 
observable characteristics of i, the two equations can be written as: 
 Prob(Yi = 1| Xi) = Fy (βy,0 + βy,1′ Xi + εy,i) (1) 
 Prob(Zi = 1| Xi) = Fz (βz,0 + βz,1′ Xi + εz,i) (2) 
where Fy and Fy are two appropriate CDFs and εy,i and εz,i two well-behaved error terms. The 
second step requires to test the null hypothesis that εy,i and εz,i  are not positively 
(significantly) correlated.  
This test can be implemented also in the context of securitization. In order to do so, it 
is necessary to figure out, in the context of securitization deals, what is the risk which is 
transferred, who is the insurer, who is the insured and what is the menu of contracts the 
insured can choose from. 
As already pointed out, the securitization market is a kind of insurance market where 
banks can buy protection from the risk of default of the loans in their portfolio. The insured 
is therefore the bank originating the loans, the insurer is the “market” (the set of investors 
purchasing the securities issued by the SPV and therefore bearing the risk of default of the 
underlying loans), the risk transferred is that of default on the loans moved onto the SPV 
balance sheet and the menu of contracts among which the insured can choose ranges 
between the two extremes of “full coverage” and of “no coverage”. The former simply 
corresponds to the case in which an individual loan is included in a securitization operation 
(and no equity tranche is retained); the latter corresponds to the opposite case in which such 
a loan remains on the balance sheet of the originating bank. 
Adopting these definitions, the analysis consists in testing the sign of the correlation of 
the residuals of two equations like (1) and (2) estimated on the cross-section of all the 
individual loans included in the sample and where Yi  is a dummy equal to 1 if loan i has 23 
been securitized and 0 otherwise, Zi  = 1 is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual loan 
defaulted and 0 otherwise, Xi  is a vector of the observable characteristics of loan i.
 14 
4.2  Defining the vector of observable characteristics Xi 
One important condition which needs to be satisfied when testing asymmetric 
information is that the characteristics observable by the insurer and relevant for the risk 
profile (for example, age or gender) are duly controlled for. The reason is that observable 
risk is likely to affect the choice of the coverage level (for instance, because the pricing of 
the insurance scheme is typically conditional on observable characteristics) and, moreover, 
to be correlated with unobservable risk. Failing to control for observable risk would induce 
biased results. In the specific context of securitizations one additional difficulty is that of 
assessing what is included in the information set of the insurer. One can make several 
conjectures. 
4.2.1  Individual loan-level information 
First, one has to evaluate if the market has information at the individual loan level or 
not. In principle, it is unlikely that investors purchasing the SPV-issued securities have 
access to such a detailed set of information. One plausible assumption would be that the 
market just looks at the overall characteristics of the deal, as summarized in the rating of the 
ABS. 
                                                           
14 There are other ways to implement the test of asymmetric information proposed by Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000) in the context of securitization. One alternative possibility would consist in adopting a more aggregate 
approach by considering the risk of losses on a given loan portfolio. In such a case, the contracts with “more 
comprehensive coverage” would be represented by the deals where the originating bank retains more of the 
securities issued by the SPV. In order to evaluate how much risk is actually retained, it would be necessary to 
consider the composition of the portfolio of securities issued by the SPV (i.e. how important are the equity and 
the mezzanine tranches) and, within each seniority class, how much is purchased by the originating bank. With 
this approach, the test of asymmetric information would require to consider only the cross-section of 
securitization deals and to verify if those with a lower level of risk retention are also those in which the loan 
portfolio exhibits a higher default frequency. This is different from what we have in this paper where the test of 
asymmetric information consists in verifying, in the cros-section of all loans, if those which are securitized are 
less likely to default. We focus on the disaggregate approach because the use of micro-level data compared to 
more aggregate information, has the big advantage of exploiting a much finer and larger set of information (in 
the dataset, we have information on more than one million of mortgages, compared to more than 80 
securitization operations). In particular, given the different hypothesis which can be made about what is 
included in the market’s information set, the use of individual loan data also allows us to check what happens 
once we condition on individual loan characteristics.. 24 
On the other hand, it should be taken into account that these deals are often conducted 
through arrangers, typically international investment banks. The main role of these 
institutions is to materially organize the deals and an important part of this activity precisely 
consists in verifying the quality of the loans involved (for instance, by inspecting the 
relevant documents but also by direct examination of the underlying real estate). Depending 
on how easily the arranger can transmit such information to third parties, one cannot exclude 
that through such activity all information asymmetries are resolved and this is why in the 
benchmark regressions the vector of control Xi includes the available characteristics at the 
individual loan level. These are represented by a large set of dummies capturing both 
borrower’s characteristics (mainly age, gender, place of birth, place of residence, distance 
from the lender’s headquarter) and contract’s characteristics (size of the loan, interest rate 
spread, date of origination, type of interest rate indexation, if it is a mortgage on preferential 
terms/rate, if it has a joint liability). 
The number of controls we utilize to take into account heterogeneity in observable risk 
at the individual loan level is quite large. On top of that, we also have the spread applied on 
each loan. The spread is a “catch-all” variable that summarizes all the characteristics 
relevant for the risk profile.
15 This is particularly true in our regressions, where we also 
control for differences across loans in the lender’s market power in the local market (see 
below). This should be sufficient to overcome some limitations of the dataset, such as the 
lack of information on the loan-to-value ratio, the length of the mortgage contract and the 
income of the borrowers.   
4.2.2  Characteristics of the originating bank  
A second issue concerns the possibility that the market assesses the quality of the 
securitized loan portfolio by looking also at the characteristics of the originating bank. One 
obvious reason for this is that banks may show different ability or willingness in screening 
borrowers. Accordingly, in the analysis we take into account of a number of bank-specific 
characteristics that have been shown in the literature to be relevant in influencing loan 
supply, in particular, the level of bank capital, the liquidity ratio, banks’ size, their market 25 
power and profitability. These time-varying bank features are taken, for each loan, at the 
date of its origination.  
As pointed out by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) in the case of the insurance market the 
choice of whether to get full coverage or not could also be determined by totally different 
factors (say, preferences or risk aversion) that, by coincidence, turn out to be positively 
correlated with risk. To address this issue, in some regressions we also take into account all, 
even unobservable, time-invariant bank features by including a set of bank dummies.  
4.2.3  Characteristics of the securitization deal 
While it is not clear if the market information set includes the characteristics of the 
individual securitized loans, it certainly includes all the relevant characteristics  of the 
securitization deal, such as: the size of the whole deal, the seniority structure of the portfolio 
of SPV-issued securities, the characteristics of these securities (maturity, spread, rating), the 
discount applied as measured by the difference between the nominal value and the sale price 
of the entire portfolio. As already emphasized, an important aspect of a securitization 
transaction is represented by the share of securities retained  by the bank (within each 
seniority class). This information is important for two reasons: first, if the bank retains some 
risk, the risk actually borne by the market mechanically decreases; second, it is commonly 
argued that such risk retention by the originating bank is a signaling device to certify the 
quality to the market (or, equivalently, it is a commitment device to continue monitoring 
these loans). 
Other characteristics of the deal which we consider are the number of originating 
banks (a large number of lenders may generate coordination failures and an associated 
reduction of the loan portfolio quality) and the experience of the originating bank in the 
securitization market (how many deals it carried out before the one considered). The latter 
feature is meant to capture possible reputational effects which may induce “beginners” to 
sell above-average quality loan portfolios. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
15 This is perfectly consistent with market practices. For instance, in the syndicated loan market, loans are 
classified (into leveraged and non-leveraged) only according to the spread. 26 
As a final remark, it is useful to point out that in our analysis it is not necessary to take 
into account the pricing of the “insurance”. In models of asymmetric information, both the 
principal and the agent are assumed to be rational and to correctly anticipate each other’s 
equilibrium strategic behavior. The insurer anticipates that the “full coverage” contract is 
more likely to be picked up by agents that exhibit both higher observable and non-
observable risk, and will price accordingly (lemon “discount”). This, however, is irrelevant 
for the test as it can be shown that, in general, the equilibrium (endogenous) pricing does not 
change the implications of asymmetric information on the correlation between contract 
choice and accident probability (see Chiappori and Salanié (2000) for a discussion on this 
point). 
4.3  Alternative approaches 
In order to evaluate the robustness of the results obtained with respect to the 
methodology used, we also conduct a treatment effect analysis where the (endogenous) 
treatment of the individual loan consists in including it in a securitization deal. The main 
advantage and at the same time the main limitation of this more structural approach consists 
in forcing us to make some identification assumptions. In particular, in the treatment 
equation the probability of being securitized is assumed to be exogenously influenced by 
bank characteristics not included in the main regression for the default probability, such as 
the location of the bank headquarters (a dummy for banks located in Southern Italy), bank 
profitability (ROE) and, for each loan, the bank’s market share in the local market where the 
loan is issued. The most important limitation of this approach, which is the reason why we 
explore it for the sake of a robustness test, is that it requires a linear form for the main 
regression, which might not be satisfactory in our context where the dependent variable is 
the default dummy. 
5. Results 
5.1  The empirical strategy 
Given our analogy with the insurance industry, in using the Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000) framework we must define the information set of the “insurer”, in our case the buyers 27 
of securitized products. In the best case scenario, buyers have as much information as we 
have about individual loans and borrowers and about originators. This is entirely plausible, 
since arrangers offer a third-party certification service that includes checking individual 
contracts, and they have the incentive to be as thorough as possible. However buyers might 
have less information (e.g. they might not know in detail the characteristics of the contracts, 
borrowers or originators). In this case, if we include information that is not available to 
them, we bias the result in the direction of excluding asymmetric information effect (we 
would be overestimating the information set of the “insurer”). Therefore we start by using all 
the control variables we have, then exclude some. 
In general before using the bi-probit specification illustrated in section 4.1 we run a 
basic probit regression in which the dependent variable is Z (equals to one in case of default, 
zero otherwise) and we include among the independent variables Y (equals to one if the 
mortgage is securitized, zero otherwise). Clearly Y has a high chance of being endogenous, 
but this first run gives an intuition of what the results might be. 
Our control variables allow us to analyze asymmetric information across space: 
differences among borrowers, types of contract and originators, characteristics of the 
securitization deal. We then check whether asymmetric information effects change across 
time, and whether they depend on the degree of risk transfer of the deal. Finally, we run 
robustness checks, in particular by using treatment effect models for the endogeneity of the 
securitization variable.    
5.2  The baseline setup 
As a preliminary step, we start by running a basic probit regression that models the 
probability of default conditional on the set of control variables and on the dummy for 
securitized loans (see Table 5, Column I). The set of control variables represents the 
market’s information set which is assumed to include contract types, individual borrower’s 
characteristics and bank and origination year fixed effects.
16  
                                                           
16 As previously pointed out, we could make several assumptions about what is included in the market’s 
information set and what is not. Below, we will illustrate and discuss the results obtained under several 
alternative choices. 28 
The main result of the baseline regression, a probit with all the information available, 
is that the coefficient for the Securitized dummy variable is negative and highly significant: 
securitized loans are much less likely to default (column II of Table 5 provides the marginal 
effect, around 3% less than other mortgages). This result is consistent with Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Felici (2010), who find that Italian securitized mortgages are less likely to be 
delinquent and to default. 
Now a short discussion of the coefficients of the control variables, even though what 
we really care about is the relationship between securitization and risk. Since these 
coefficients are stable in terms of magnitude and significance across most specifications we 
don’t comment on them in the other sections. 
The coefficients of the variables that describe the borrowers’ characteristics are all 
significant and with the expected sign. Mortgages on preferential terms have a lower 
probability of default; as they are granted mostly to employees of large firms or civil 
servants, with higher job security and more stable salaries, they may be expected to be less 
risky than average. Fixed-rate mortgages have a lower probability of default, maybe also 
because they leave part of the interest rate risk with the lender (this finding is in line with 
Paiella and Pozzolo, 2007). Borrowers from Southern Italy have a higher probability of 
default, corroborating the idea that this part of the country is distinguished by a higher 
“background risk” (see, among others, Panetta, 2003). And, as already shown in the 
literature, women borrowers have a lower probability of default (Alesina et al., 2009). 
Young borrowers (under 40) have a higher probability of default (for the U.S. see Athreya, 
2008), probably reflecting their higher income uncertainty. Joint mortgages turn out to be 
less risky, as intuition would suggest since the presence of an additional guarantor reduces 
default risk. The coefficient for loan size reveals that larger mortgages have a higher 
probability of default, reflecting the effect of leverage on risk. The greater the distance to the 
bank’s headquarters, the higher the probability of default. Similar findings have been 
explained by arguing that the soft information used by banks to assess creditworthiness is 
more widely available where the bank has its territorial roots and where costs of monitoring 
tend to be lower (see Berger et al. 2005; Casolaro and Mistrulli, 2009). The dummy 
Emigrant takes the value of 1 if the borrower’s residence is in a province that is different 
from the province of birth, and of 0 otherwise. This variable should capture additional 29 
asymmetric information effects as there might be less soft information on borrowers who 
might not have been in the same place for long. As expected, loans to Emigrants are more 
likely to default.
17  
Finally, loans with higher spreads have a higher probability of default. As the spread is 
in theory a sufficient statistic for the bank’s assessment of the borrower’s risk, this should 
come as no surprise. In our setup, where we control directly for many of the borrower’s 
characteristics, the spread captures differences in the level of risk connected with those 
which are relevant for the assessment of credit risk, but are not available in the dataset 
(borrower’s income, the loan-to-value ratio and maturity of the mortgage). 
We then discuss variables that describe bank-specific characteristics. Again, although 
we are not directly interested in assessing the role of these variables in the default equation, 
we also consider them as in principle the market might evaluate the quality of the securitized 
assets by looking at the characteristics of the originator.
18 All variables are measured at the 
moment of origination of the loan. The excess capital to assets ratio is defined as the 
difference between total supervisory capital and supervisory requirements, over total assets. 
Loans granted by banks with higher excess capital are more likely to default. This is 
consistent with the idea that the level of bank excess capital is chosen by financial 
intermediaries in a way that is consistent with its risk profile: highly capitalized banks 
choose an overall riskier strategy (and grant high-risk loans). Mortgages granted by banks 
with a higher liquidity ratio (cash and securities over total assets) display a lower default 
probability 
The results of this basic probit regression, however, cannot be taken at face value as 
many of the right-hand variables are clearly endogenous: the risk profile of the borrower is 
likely to influence the choice of loan contract. Most importantly, an issue of endogeneity 
may arise in particular for the dummy for securitized loans which, precisely because of 
adverse selection, may be itself influenced by the default probability.  
                                                           
17 There are few coefficients switching their sign in the regression for the probability of being securitized. 
As already pointed out, these coefficients are those of a reduced form and we should not attach too much 
emphasis to them. Nonetheless, we will show that in more complete specifications their sign will again be the 
“correct” one. 
18 All the regressions in Table 4, including those already remarked, include bank-fixed effects. 30 
As explained in Section 4, the way to proceed, based on the framework developed by 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000), requires us to estimate a system of two equations, one for the 
default probability and one for the probability of being securitized, with the same set of 
explanatory variables summarizing the market’s information set, and then to test the 
correlation of the residuals. 
The coefficients of the control variables in the regression for the default probability 
have the same sign and almost exactly the same magnitude and level of significance as in 
our  
baseline probit (see Table 5, Column III).
19 
Also the coefficients in the model for the probability of being securitized are 
significant. More opaque loans, those for which issues of asymmetric information are more 
relevant, should be less likely to be included in a securitization deal; on the other hand, 
banks might want to get rid of them if opaqueness is associated to risk. Loans to young 
borrowers, who tend to have little credit history from which the originating bank could 
obtain private information, turn out more likely to be included in a securitization operation. 
Loans to borrowers living close to the bank’s headquarters, for which the lender can more 
easily obtain soft information and carry out its monitoring activity, are not just less risky but 
also less opaque and less likely to be securitized. Joint mortgages, thanks to the additional 
guarantee they provide, are similar to loans with more covenants that diminish the effects of 
asymmetric information (Drucker and Puri, 2009); coherently, they display a higher 
probability of being sold. The coefficient for the dummy denoting a mortgage on preferential 
terms, granted to people with a more stable income stream (civil servants or employees in 
large companies), characterizes borrowers whose credit risk profile is more easily evaluated 
and, indeed, the coefficient turns out to be positive. Symmetrically, mortgages granted in 
Southern Italy are typically seen as more opaque (for example, because of higher tax evasion 
which decreases the information content of “hard facts” based on official records
20) and are 
                                                           
19 More generally, it has to be kept in mind that this framework is aimed at obtaining a correct evaluation of 
the conditional correlation between the probability of default and that of being securitized. As the two 
equations are reduced forms, the interpretability of the coefficients is not essential for the analysis. The 
interpretation provided, although reasonable, should be taken with caution as we are not estimating causal 
relationship. 
20 See, for instance, Brosio et al. (2002). 31 
indeed less likely to be securitized. The higher trustworthiness of female borrowers can be 
used to explain not just their lower default probability but also to argue that they belong to a 
more transparent credit segment, with a higher probability of being securitized. 
The remaining regressors seem more correlated with risk rather than with the level of 
transparency; therefore, they are not subject to an obvious interpretation. At any rate, the 
coefficients for these variables suggest that, everything else being equal, securitization is 
easier in less risky segments of the credit market. The probability of being sold is indeed 
higher for mortgages with a fixed rate and with a smaller spread.
21 Only the result for size of 
the loan goes in the opposite direction, as the larger it is (and the riskier the loan), the higher 
the probability of it being included in a securitization operation, possibly because of some 
fixed administrative costs which might make high-value mortgages more suitable for this 
purpose. 
Going to the objective of this exercise, the conclusion is that the main result is 
unchanged: the negative correlation between the residuals of the two probit regressions, 
significant at a 1% level, leads to a strong rejection of the hypothesis that in the 
securitization market riskier loans have a higher probability of being sold.
22 This is not to 
say that asymmetric information is not an issue but that the market is able to find ways to 
counter it or at least to diminish its effects. As suggested by the coefficients in the regression 
for the probability of being securitized, the first and most obvious way to do so is to 
securitize the loans characterized by the lower level of opacity. 
When we reduce the information set available to the “insurer”, by keeping either only 
information on contracts and borrowers but not originators (Table 6), or only information on 
originators but not on contracts types of borrowers (Table 7), the result is the same: the 
correlation between residuals is negative, significant at the 1% level and almost of the same 
size as the full information set (the coefficient of the Securitization dummy in the basic 
probit regression is almost the same as in the baseline, full information specification).  32 
5.3  Characteristics of the securitization deal 
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the market is able to find 
ways to contrast asymmetric information problems or at least to mitigate its effects. As 
previously argued, one obvious tool for the market to contrast asymmetric information in the 
securitization market is to select loans characterized by a lower level of opacity. However, 
this is not sufficient to fully explain our findings as not only the correlation among the 
residual is not significantly positive, but it is significantly negative, revealing that banks tend 
to securitize better-than-average loans. We therefore explore the role played by the 
mechanisms that are usually considered to help banks signal the quality of their assets and, 
in particular, we check how the results are affected by the way in which the securitization 
deal is structured. All the deal characteristics are interacted with the Securitization dummy. 
We cannot use the bi-probit set up because deal characteristics are defined only for 
securitized loans. In Table 8 we follow the same pattern analyzed before: first the full 
information set, then only contract and borrowers’ characteristics, then only originators’ 
characteristics. As the coefficients are very similar across the three simple probit 
regressions, we discuss them only once. 
  The coefficient of the Securitized dummy remains negative, significant at the 1% 
level and of the same magnitude as in Tables 5–7. A brief discussion of the coefficients of 
the variables that describe the securitization deals follows.  
The size of the equity tranche is an indicator of the riskiness of the pool of loans being 
securitized. We include it, as well as the share of the equity tranche retained by the 
originator, which is proportional to how much “skin in the game” the originator wants to 
keep, and signals therefore the commitment both to securitize “safe loans” and to monitor 
securitized loans after the deal. Both coefficients are significant and with the expected sign. 
The number of securitizing banks might also influence the quality of the pool of loans: 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
21 One way to read this evidence is to argue that the level of transparency does not matter if the general 
level of risk is sufficiently low. In this situation indeed even “bad types” are not going to default. It should be 
noted, however, that banks also conducted securitizations of bad loans, which is itself a quite risky segment as 
presumably the uncertainty about the recovery rates is quite high. 
22 It is interesting to point out that this apparently surprising result of a negative correlation among the 
residuals in an exercise aimed at testing asymmetric information has been found also in other contexts (for 
example, Chiappori and Salanié, 2000, looking at data on car insurance). 33 
each bank might have an incentive to contribute riskier-than-average loans and thus free-ride 
on the reputation of other participants.
23 Indeed the coefficient of this variable, added in the 
Default probit regression, is positive and significant. 
We also include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the accounting value of portfolio of the 
securitized loans is lower than its face value, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of this 
variable is not significant: the variable doesn’t seem to contain any additional information on 
the risk of loans. 
Finally, we add as a control variable the share of the securitization deal that is 
investment grade: other things being equal (in particular the share of the equity tranche) the 
higher it is, the higher the quality of the pool of loans. As expected, the coefficient of this 
variable is significant and negative in the Default probit regression. 
In a bi-probit framework (unreported; results available from the authors) the 
correlation between residuals is still significantly negative, although smaller in absolute 
value than that in Table 5 (–24.9% against –31.2% of the baseline bivariate probit; the 
difference is significant at a 1% level of confidence). This is consistent with the view that 
the structure of securitization deal, and in particular the share of the equity tranche retained 
by the bank, is chosen so as to contrast asymmetric information issues. 
5.4  The role of the spread as a catch-all variable for credit risk 
As already discussed, one important control variable in our estimations is the spread, 
which is meant to be a catch-all measure for risk (at least for what is not directly controlled 
for by the other variables). One possible problem with this is that if the market infers the risk 
of a loan from its spread, then this could generate the possibility for banks of under-pricing 
strategically high-risk loans with the idea of selling them in a second step. We check the 
relevance of this issue by conducting the estimation separately on two sub-samples: one 
comprises the loans issued until 1999, the year of the introduction of the law allowing banks 
to operate in the securitization market; the second comprises the remaining observations.  
By comparing the relationship between the probabilities of being securitized and of 
                                                           
 
23 All the deals with multiple originators in our sample are operations conducted by pooling loans issued by 34 
defaulting for loans originated before and after 1999 we do not observe a discernible 
difference between the two periods (Table 9). The coefficient of the Securitized dummy in 
the reduced form regression is still negative and significant and of similar magnitude for 
loans originated after 1999. The same can be said of the correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the Default and the Securitized regressions; most control variables keep the 
same sign. The development of a market for securitized instruments was not accompanied by 
laxer lending standards.  
One striking result of our regressions is that not only is the correlation among the 
residuals not positive, but it is significantly negative, suggesting that in the period analyzed 
banks sold loans with a quality that was higher than one should have expected on the basis 
of observable characteristics. One explanation for this is reputation-building. If banks care 
about having access to this important source of funding, then they may try to build up their 
own reputation by selling better-than-average quality loans (therefore at an “actuarially 
lower” price) until they have a sufficient “reputation stock” allowing them to operate in this 
market. 
To verify whether this took place, we check how this correlation evolved over time. 
We therefore perform an analysis similar to that presented in Table 5 but at a more 
disaggregated level: we run regressions on all the sub-samples distinguished by the year of 
origination. We then plot the time-series of the correlation coefficients among the residuals 
of the two equations (Fig. 2).
24 The curve stays flat until 2004, then it starts converging 
towards zero. This pattern is consistent with the presence of a reputation mechanism: as long 
as banks are building up their own reputation, they tend to securitize better-than-average 
loans and, on the other hand, for fear of loosing their newly acquired reputation, they do not 
sell below-average lemons, even after a few years.
25 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
different banks belonging to the same banking group. 
24 This exercise provide a robustness test also with respect to another non fully satisfactory aspect of our 
main baseline regressions, which is related to the fact the definition of two dependent variables neglects the 
time available for the loan going into default or being securitized since its origination. By conducting 
estimation for groups with homogeneous date of origination, this possible limitation is overcome. 
25 The lager size of the confidence band at the beginning of the period is due to the fact that we have fewer 
observations for those years but it is also consistent with the patterns that we should observe in the presence of 
reputation mechanisms. In fact, at the early stage of the market, the equilibrium requires that the presence of 
banks selling, on average, good-quality loans comes with some other banks exploiting the asymmetric 
information by selling lemons (these banks are those not interested in accessing this source of finance in the 35 
As a final test we wanted to check if results are still valid if the spread from the set of 
observable variables (see Table 10) is removed. The reason for this test is twofold. First, the 
spread may reflect private information available for the bank but not for the market; second 
the spread could endogenously reflect the expected default probability of the mortgage that 
is not incorporated in the vector X. The test confirmed the robustness of the results.  
5.5  High vs low risk transfer 
A potential issue is that, if the originator retains much of the risk, for example by 
holding onto the equity tranche, then the deal does not mean much in terms of insurance 
against default – it becomes only a bank-internal portfolio re-arrangement in which the 
choice of loans being securitized does not necessarily depend on risk but might depend on 
liquidity needs. For example, in 2007–2009 almost all the deals were self-securitizations 
arranged to be used as collateral to tap the central bank’s liquidity. 
In order to address this issue, we re-define our Securitized dummy as: High Risk 
Transfer (HRT) equals one if the loan is sold in a deal in which the equity tranche is above 
the median (transaction with relatively high risk) and in which the originator’s equity stake 
is below the median (deal in which the originator sells relatively more risk), and zero 
otherwise. All loans sold in transactions that don’t satisfy this requisite are treated as not 
securitized.  
The result of the bi-probit analysis, with the three formats of full information, only 
contracts and borrowers, only originators, is that the correlation between residuals is still 
negative, significant at the 1% level (Table 11) and slightly smaller than for the same 
specifications with the Securitized dummy taking a value of one for any deal. This confirms 
our main result that banks securitize better-than-average mortgages. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
future and therefore not interested in building up their reputation). Therefore, one implication of an equilibrium 
based on reputation is that at the early stage of the market we should observe a higher heterogeneity of 
behavior, which may account for the larger confidence bands in the estimation of the correlation among the 
residuals. 36 
Is there any systematic difference between loans securitized in high- and low-risk 
transfer deals? To analyze this issue we look only at securitized loans, and run our standard 
bi-probit framework on them.
26 
The result is that the correlation becomes positive: loans belonging to HRT deals have 
a higher probability of default (Table 12). In other words, banks sell loans that are better 
than average even in HRT deals (see results of Table 11) but, when choosing how much risk 
to keep given the characteristics of the deal, they keep a higher share of risk in deals in 
which loans are of better quality. There are two possible explanations for this behavior: 
banks could be signaling which deals are lower risk (the ones in which they keep more “skin 
in the game”), or they could be doing some form of cherry-picking, selling the riskier deals 
and keeping the better ones. 
We check whether there is any difference between HRT before and after 1999 (the 
beginning of securitization in Italy); the correlation is positive and larger for loans originated 
before 1999 (Table 13), meaning that the quality of the pre-securitization law loans inserted 
in the retained bundles were better off than other mortgages. This is consistent both with 
banks needing to give stronger signals at the inception of a new market, and of them being 
less able to do cherry picking as investors become better at evaluating deals. 
We can not offer any firm conclusions on this point, but we have some tentative 
evidence. For a subsample of deals (37 out of 81) we have data on the spread paid by the 
senior tranche. If the share of equity retained by the originator is correlated with some form 
of cherry-picking, the spread on the senior tranche should be higher (investors suspect a 
lemon and ask for a premium); if on the other hand the higher share is due to some form of 
signaling, the spread should be lower (investors recognize that it is a “safer” deal). In a 
simple OLS regression with a dummy for non-triple A rating (control for risk) and past 
securitizations (reputation) as control variables (as well bank-fixed effects) we find that 
when the share of retained equity is higher the spread on the senior tranche is lower (Table 
14): this is more consistent with signaling than with cherry picking.    
                                                           
26 Here we are closer than ever to Chiappori and Salanié (2000): HRT=1 is very similar to Comprehensive 
Coverage, and HRT=0 to Partial Coverage. 37 
5.6  A horse race among high-quality mortgages  
The pool of loans that can be securitized at a given date t consists of all performing 
loans at that date. This means that as long as banks wait for some time after origination 
before including them into a securitization operation, the pool of loans that are actually 
securitized is drawn from a sample which is self-selected and over-represents good-quality 
contracts. The reason for this is that at the time of securitization (for example, two years 
since origination) some of the loans would have already defaulted and as such cannot be 
securitized; moreover, the proportion of loans defaulted “prior” to securitization (i.e. in the 
first two years of life) will tend to be higher among the bad quality ones. This implies that 
securitized loans are drawn from a distribution of higher quality compared to the entire 
population, the more so the longer the time elapsed from origination to securitization.
27 This 
issue, moreover, could be expected to be empirically relevant given that, as shown in Figure 
3, most of the mortgages going into default do so in the first years of their life. 
To check the robustness of the previous results, we re-ran our tests by considering 
separately securitized loans by vintage. By doing so we can rebalance the estimation sample 
in a way that allows us to compare securitized loans with non-securitized loans drawn from a 
distribution which is fully comparable with that from which securitized loans are drawn.  
Consider for example the loans securitized in the second year of life (i.e. aged one). 
The rebalancing of the dataset is done in three steps. (i) We drop from the estimation all non-
securitized mortgages that defaulted in the first year of life (i.e. those that could not be 
securitized in their second year of life). (ii) We set as non-securitized all securitized loans 
that have been sold after the second year of life. (iii) We drop from the estimation sample all 
mortgages securitized during their first year of life.  
The results of the estimation on this sub-sample are presented in the first panel of 
Table 15, for the baseline regression (full information set specification). All the main 
findings are confirmed: only few coefficients lose statistical significance or change sign; the 
                                                           
27 We thank Bernard Salanié for this observation. 38 
sign of the correlation among the residuals, although smaller in absolute value, remains 
negative and highly significant.
28 
As in the full sample most of the securitized mortgages are sold in the second to fourth 
year of life (i.e. when aged one to three; Figure 3), we repeated this exercise by considering 
only securitized loans which are sold in their third year of life (i.e. aged two) and then by 
considering only securitized loans which are sold in their fourth year of life (i.e. aged three). 
Again, all the results. presented in the second and third panel of Table 15 respectively, are 
confirmed. 
5.7  Alternative econometric approaches 
As a final robustness check, we run the same set of regressions using a two-step 
treatment model, which considers the effect of an endogenously chosen variable 
(Securitized) on another endogenous variable (Default), conditional on two sets of 
independent variables. In our selection equation the dependent variable is the Securitized 
dummy and to avoid identification problems with the main equation we add bank 
characteristic variables such as the location of the bank’s headquarters, the bank’s return on 
equity and a measure of its market power (a weighted average of its Herfindahl indices on 
provincial loan markets).
29 In the main equation the dependent variable is the Default 
dummy; once again, the coefficient of the Securitized dummy (from the selection equation) 
is negative and significant (Table 16), in all four cases. 
We also compare the marginal effect of Securitized mortgages on Default in the two 
settings: our baseline regression in which we don’t control for endogeneity and the two-step 
treatment model. The marginal effect is very similar in both cases, and around 3 percentage 
                                                           
 
28 In order to limit computational issues, which turn out to prevent the estimation of these models, 
regressions have been conducted on a randomly chosen sub-sample (representing 30% of the full sample) and 
without the set of dummies for banks. Estimations conducted on even smaller sub-samples shows that the 
inclusion of the bank dummies leaves the results unchanged (estimations not displayed and available from the 
authors). 
29 These variables should be more correlated with the probability for a bank to securitize a loan than with 
the loan’s probability of default. Bank headquarter’s location and market power control for the ability of a 
credit intermediary to tap funds in the local market. This could alter a bank’s willingness to securitize the loan 
but should not be correlated with its default probability. On the other hand, what is relevant for a loan’s default 
is the borrower’s area of residence as included in the default equation. The ROE could signal a bank’s quality 39 
points: a Securitized loan has a probability of default that is 3 percentage points lower than a 
non-securitized loan. This is consistent with our descriptive statistics (Table 2) and reassures 
us that the results we obtain in our baseline regression are robust. 
6. Conclusions 
The subprime mortgage crisis in the US has highlighted some limits of the originate-
to-distribute model, an intermediation approach adopted by banks that originate, repackage 
and then sell their loans to the market. In this paper we investigate banks’ behavior as it 
relates to the larger part of the market for securitized assets, i.e. prime mortgages. Our 
sample consists of a unique dataset of more than one million household mortgages originated 
by 50 Italian banks in the 10 years prior to the financial crisis. The richness of information 
contained in the database allows us to control for a wide set of relevant characteristics that 
are not available in existing studies, including: loan-level variables, characteristics of the 
originating bank and, most importantly, contractual features of the securitization deal 
including, in particular, the seniority structure of the securities issued by the SPV and the 
amount retained by the originator. 
Our results suggest that securitized loans have a lower probability of default, 
indicating that the securitization market can provide an appropriate tool for transferring 
credit risk efficiently. This result is consistent with the idea that the choice of the loans to be 
securitized is made with the aim of overcoming asymmetric information problems. Beyond 
this, we provide new direct evidence that the structure of the securitization deals is also 
chosen with a view to mitigating the costs of asymmetric information. We find evidence 
consistent with the fact that banks, particularly at the early stage of the securitization market 
life, are strongly committed to building up a reputation that will allow them to ensure 
repeated access to this important source of funding. This is consistent with the traditional 
certification role performed by banks, as emphasized by Drucker and Puri (2009). It 
obviously depends also on the sound institutional and supervisory framework provided by 
Italian authorities, which demand a high level of disclosure in securitization deals. Further 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
to the market. A high ROE in t-1 could increase the probability of securitizing a loan at t. This variable should 
not have a strong causal correlation with future defaults, once one controls for borrowers’ characteristics. 40 
research, conducted on cross-country data, could help disentangle the institutional and the 
financial parts of this result.  
The broad policy implication of our paper is that the securitization of prime mortgages 
is a soundly functioning market and should not be excessively penalized. The OTD model 
per se cannot be blamed for having induced reckless risk-taking; securitization is not always 
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Table 1 
































2000 34,094              746                  8,289              9    3.7      55,524             811                1.9      92.0    
2001 39,559              2,804               31,156            18    8.2      64,466             3,238             5.8      86.6    
2002 52,823              2,354               18,954            22    4.6      81,445             2,589             4.0      90.9    
2003 65,738              4,884               41,149            22    7.3      100,930           5,490             6.7      89.0    
2004 82,951              2,354               16,409            16    2.8      129,861           3,468             3.4      67.9    
2005 103,045            3,686               27,622            20    3.7      163,523           5,344             4.1      69.0    
2006 119,963            9,576               80,088            20    8.8      195,853           11,567           7.1      82.8    
Total 498,173           26,404            223,666         50    6.8      791,602          32,508          5.3      81.2    
Notes: (1) Bad loans are excluded. 




Italian Banking System Banks included in the sampleYear of loan origination
Number of 



















































over total assets 
(%)
,164 15.9% 2.8% 126,050 1.20 18.4% 61.0% 26.7% 10.2% 13.7% 6.4% 15.1% 30465 9.2
2000-2002          60,375  21.9% 2.2% 122,915 0.92 26.8% 61.5% 20.4% 11.1% 14.0% 12.0% 8.4% 42810 7.2
2003-2006        134,429  17.2% 1.5% 128,382 0.27 46.0% 57.6% 9.1% 12.7% 16.1% 20.0% 9.0% 39915 5.3
1996-2006        202,968  18.3% 1.7% 126,660 0.50 39.2% 58.9% 13.2% 12.1% 15.4% 17.1% 9.1% 40320 6.0
1996-1999          43,301  84.1% 8.0% 119,205 1.04 24.0% 57.7% 18.8% 12.2% 14.5% 6.0% 16.4% 40335 8.7
2000-2002        215,260  78.1% 5.9% 115,778 0.96 25.6% 57.2% 14.5% 11.9% 15.6% 11.7% 8.0% 67603 6.8
2003-2006        646,423  82.8% 3.9% 131,141 0.47 33.4% 54.8% 14.0% 18.8% 17.0% 21.8% 7.7% 41706 4.0
1996-2006        904,983  81.7% 4.5% 126,915 0.61 31.1% 55.5% 14.4% 16.8% 16.6% 18.6% 8.2% 46708 4.9
1996-1999          51,465  100.0% 7.2% 120,275 1.06 23.1% 58.2% 20.0% 11.9% 14.4% 6.1% 16.2% 38,604 8.8
2000-2002        275,635  100.0% 5.1% 117,336 0.95 25.9% 58.1% 15.8% 11.7% 15.2% 11.7% 8.1% 61,185 6.9
2003-2006        780,852  100.0% 3.4% 130,668 0.44 35.5% 55.3% 13.2% 17.7% 16.9% 21.5% 7.9% 41,393 4.2
1996-2006 1,107,951     100.0% 4.0% 126,869 0.59 32.5% 56.1% 14.1% 16.0% 16.3% 18.3% 8.3% 45,472 5.1























BREAKDOWN OF THE DATASET BY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
SECURITIZATION DEAL
(1) 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
        
Number of originating banks   1.31  1.06  1.00  9.00 
        
Senior tranche weigthed average (2)  0.91  0.17  0.02  1.00 
Mezzanine tranche weigthed average (2)  0.08  0.15  0.00  0.88 
Equity tranche weigthed average (2)  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.98 
        
Senior tranche retained by the originator  0.04  0.16  0.00  1.00 
Mezzanine tranche ratained by the 
originator 0.11  0.27  0.00  1.00 
Equity tranche retained by the originator  0.66  0.45  0.00  1.00 
        
Rating senior tranche (3)  1.04  0.10  1.00  1.41 
Rating mezzanine tranche (3)  5.93  1.36  3.00  7.51 
Rating equity tranche(3)  9.00  0.00  9.00  9.00 
Investment grade (4)  0.41  0.49  0.00  1.00 
        
Spread senior  0.25  0.18  0.08  0.98 
Spread mezzanine  0.73  0.49  0.35  2.75 
Spread equity  1.04  0.27  0.70  3.30 
        
Maturity senior tranche (5)  25.62  9.17  8.63  40.00 
Maturity mezzanine tranche (5)  27.05  9.58  8.94  40.00 
Maturity equity tranche (5)  34.59  2.33  31.65  37.43 
        
Fixed senior tranche  0.01  0.09  0.00  0.65 
Fixed mezzanine tranche  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Fixed equity tranche  0.13  0.35  0.00  1.00 
        
Low value (6)  0.00  0.07  0.00  1.00 
              
Note: (1) Statistics are calculated on 81 deals. However, information on the spread is available only for 
37 deals. - (2) Weighted by the nominal value of each tranche. - (3) Ratings are represented by numerical 
numbers that go from 1 (low risk) to 9 (high risk). - (4) Investment grade is a dummy that takes the value 
of one if a specific securitization tranche as an investment grade rating (greater than BBB).- (5) Years. - 
(6) Low value is a dummy that takes the value of one for those securitization tranches that have an 






Dummy equals to 1 if the mortgage has been securitised and 0 elsewhere.
Default Dummy equals to 1 if the borrower has gone into default.
Mortgage and borrower characteristics:
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate
Dummy equals to 1 if the mortgage has preferential terms/rate and 0 
elsewhere.
Spread
Difference between the interest rate on the mortgage and the 
corresponding rate with the same maturity on the yield curve
Fixed rate mortgage Dummy equals to 1 if the mortgage has a fixed rate and 0 elsewhere.
South and Islands
Dummy equals to 1 if the borrower is resident in the Mezzogiorno and 0 
elsewhere.
Female Dummy equals to 1 if the borrower is a female and 0 elsewhere.
Close to bank headquarter
Dummy equals to 1 if the borrower is resident in the same province of the 
bank headquarter and 0 elsewhere.
Young (<40)
Dummy equals to 1 if the borrower is less than 40 years old and 0 
elsewhere.
Joint mortgage
Dummy that takes the value of 1 is the mortgage is secured by real 
property given to more than one party (i.e. a married couple). 
Mortgage value Nominal value of the mortgage contract.
Emigrants
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the borrower’s residence is in a 
province that is different from the province of birth, and of 0 otherwise. 
Bank-specific characteristics:  
Liquidity ratio
Cash plus government bonds as a percentage of total assets at the time of 
the securitization.
Excess capital to asset ratio
Difference between the level of prudential capital and minimum capital 
requirements (excess capital) over total assets
Bank ROE Bank profit over total equity.
Bank Market Power




Percentage of the lowest quality (highest credit risk) tranche in a pool of 
mortgage loans.
Equity tranche retained 
Percentage of the lowest quality (highest credit risk) tranche in a pool of 
mortgage loans that is retained by the bank.
Number of originating banks  Number of banks involved in the origination of the securitizion deal
Accounting value low
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the accounting value of portfolio of the 
securitized loans is lower than its face value, and 0 otherwise
Investment grade 






CONTROLLING FOR CONTRACT, BORROWER AND BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Securitized -0.570 *** 0.008 -0.029 *** 0.001
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.282 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.000 -0.284 *** 0.006 0.044 *** 0.004
Spread 0.002 *** 0.000 0.0001 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.000 -0.007 *** 0.001
Fixed rate mortgage -0.280 *** 0.008 -0.019 *** 0.001 -0.287 *** 0.008 0.060 *** 0.006
South and Islands 0.193 *** 0.007 0.015 *** 0.001 0.202 *** 0.006 -0.137 *** 0.005
Female -0.131 *** 0.007 -0.008 *** 0.000 -0.131 *** 0.007 0.011 ** 0.005
Close to bank headquarter -0.189 *** 0.009 -0.011 *** 0.000 -0.174 *** 0.009 -0.148 *** 0.006
Young (<40) 0.036 *** 0.006 0.001 *** 0.000 0.025 *** 0.006 0.099 *** 0.005
Joint mortgage -0.346 *** 0.006 -0.025 *** 0.000 -0.356 *** 0.006 0.151 *** 0.004
Log of mortgage value 0.203 *** 0.006 0.014 *** 0.000 0.182 *** 0.006 0.188 *** 0.004
Emigrants 0.346 *** 0.005 0.028 *** 0.000 0.332 *** 0.005 0.078 *** 0.004
Liquidity ratio -0.235 ** 0.105 -0.016 ** 0.007 -0.092 0.103 -0.975 *** 0.078
Excess capital to asset ratio 0.881 *** 0.221 0.060 *** 0.015 2.343 *** 0.223 -16.939 *** 0.223
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Pseudo R2
Correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the two equations











1996 - 2006 1996-2006
Yes Yes
Yes
 -0.312*** (standard error 0.004)
Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Explanatory variables
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CONTROLLING ONLY FOR CONTRACT AND BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Securitized -0.571 *** 0.008 -0.029 *** 0.000
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.283 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.000 -0.285 *** 0.006 0.048 *** 0.004
Spread 0.002 *** 0.000 0.0001 *** 0.000 0.002 * 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001
Fixed rate mortgage -0.279 *** 0.008 -0.019 *** 0.001 -0.287 *** 0.008 0.060 *** 0.006
South and Islands 0.193 *** 0.007 0.015 *** 0.001 0.203 *** 0.006 -0.147 *** 0.005
Female -0.132 *** 0.007 -0.008 *** 0.000 -0.131 *** 0.007 0.012 ** 0.005
Close to bank headquarter -0.190 *** 0.009 -0.011 *** 0.000 -0.174 *** 0.009 -0.143 *** 0.006
Young (<40) 0.036 *** 0.006 0.003 *** 0.000 0.026 *** 0.006 0.099 *** 0.005
Joint mortgage -0.346 *** 0.006 -0.025 *** 0.000 -0.355 *** 0.006 0.149 *** 0.004
Log of mortgage value 0.202 *** 0.006 0.014 *** 0.000 0.180 *** 0.006 0.194 *** 0.004
Emigrants 0.346 *** 0.005 0.029 *** 0.000 0.333 *** 0.005 0.071 *** 0.004
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Pseudo R2
Correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the two equations
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 -0.312*** (standard error 0.004)

















Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Securitized -0.559 *** 0.008 -0.032 *** 0.000
Liquidity ratio -0.227 ** 0.101 -0.018 ** 0.008 -0.076 0.099 -1.083 *** 0.078







residuals of the tw
Table 7 
CONTROLLING ONLY FOR BANK-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
r mortgages
ns
icient between the 
o equations
0.038 0.038





(III)                     










 -0.296*** (standard error 0.004)
















CONTROLLING FOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECURITIZATION DEAL 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Securitized -0.597 *** 0.016 -0.029 *** 0.001 -0.595 *** 0.016 -0.029 *** 0.001 -0.576 *** 0.016 -0.033 *** 0.001
Securitized*Equity tranche 0.901 *** 0.204 0.061 *** 0.014 0.860 *** 0.204 0.059 *** 0.014 0.900 *** 0.204 0.070 *** 0.014
Securitized*Equity tranche retained  -0.163 *** 0.024 -0.011 *** 0.002 -0.169 *** 0.024 -0.012 *** 0.002 -0.167 *** 0.024 -0.013 *** 0.002
Securitized*ln(number of originating banks)  0.308 *** 0.020 0.021 *** 0.001 0.306 *** 0.020 0.021 *** 0.001 0.306 *** 0.020 0.024 *** 0.001
Securitized*Accounting value low 0.111 0.112 0.008 0.009 0.108 0.112 0.008 0.009 0.177 0.112 0.016 0.011
Securitized*Investment grade  -0.049 *** 0.016 -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.050 *** 0.016 -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.029 * 0.016 -0.002 * 0.001
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.281 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.000 -0.281 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.000
Spread 0.002 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
Fixed rate mortgage -0.284 *** 0.008 -0.019 *** 0.001 -0.283 *** 0.008 -0.019 *** 0.001
South and Islands 0.193 *** 0.007 0.015 *** 0.001 0.193 *** 0.007 0.015 *** 0.001
Female -0.131 *** 0.007 -0.008 *** 0.000 -0.131 *** 0.007 -0.008 *** 0.000
Close to bank headquarter -0.189 *** 0.009 -0.011 *** 0.000 -0.189 *** 0.009 -0.011 *** 0.000
Young (<40) 0.036 *** 0.006 0.003 *** 0.000 0.036 *** 0.006 0.003 *** 0.000
Joint mortgage -0.346 *** 0.006 -0.025 *** 0.000 -0.346 *** 0.006 -0.025 *** 0.000
Log of mortgage value 0.203 *** 0.006 0.014 *** 0.000 0.203 *** 0.006 0.014 *** 0.000
Emigrants 0.346 *** 0.005 0.028 *** 0.000 0.346 *** 0.005 0.028 *** 0.000
Liquidity ratio -0.275 *** 0.105 -0.019 *** 0.007 -0.270 ** 0.105 -0.021 *** 0.008
Excess capital to asset ratio 0.708 *** 0.222 0.048 *** 0.015 1.141 *** 0.211 0.088 *** 0.016
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Pseudo R2
1996 - 2006 1996 - 2006
1,107,951 1,107,951
Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
(III)  Bank specific characteristics               
Probit regression        
Dependent variable: 
P(Defaulti=1) 
Marginal effect        
Dependent variable: 
P(Defaulti=1) 
(II)  Contract and borrower characteristics         
Probit regression        
Dependent variable: 
P(Defaulti=1) 
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0.080 0.080 0.079 0.080























CONTROLLING FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SECURITIZATION LAW 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Securitized -0.697 *** 0.044 -0.582 *** 0.011
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.557 *** 0.039 -0.538 *** 0.039 -0.119 *** 0.032 -0.294 *** 0.007 -0.293 *** 0.007 0.027 *** 0.006
Spread 0.004 ** 0.002 0.004 ** 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 * 0.001 -0.014 *** 0.002
Fixed rate mortgage -0.231 *** 0.032 -0.259 *** 0.032 0.287 *** 0.026 -0.277 *** 0.010 -0.284 *** 0.010 0.090 *** 0.007
South and Islands 0.238 *** 0.034 0.262 *** 0.034 -0.237 *** 0.035 0.178 *** 0.009 0.186 *** 0.009 -0.128 *** 0.006
Female -0.007 0.035 -0.009 0.034 0.048 0.035 -0.136 *** 0.009 -0.136 *** 0.009 0.018 *** 0.007
Close to bank headquarter -0.123 *** 0.036 -0.111 *** 0.034 -0.116 *** 0.036 -0.193 *** 0.013 -0.174 *** 0.013 -0.169 *** 0.008
Young (<40) 0.076 0.047 0.055 0.047 0.182 *** 0.049 0.025 *** 0.008 0.015 * 0.008 0.098 *** 0.007
Joint mortgage -0.156 *** 0.027 -0.166 *** 0.026 0.124 *** 0.026 -0.354 *** 0.008 -0.364 *** 0.007 0.153 *** 0.006
Log of mortgage value 0.336 *** 0.027 0.285 *** 0.024 0.392 *** 0.029 0.197 *** 0.008 0.177 *** 0.008 0.177 *** 0.006
Emigrants 0.140 *** 0.029 0.121 *** 0.029 0.138 *** 0.027 0.352 *** 0.007 0.338 *** 0.007 0.079 *** 0.005
Liquidity ratio -2.282 ** 1.160 -1.784 1.265 -2.364 4.951 0.585 *** 0.138 0.720 *** 0.137 -1.248 *** 0.107
Excess capital to asset ratio -1.501 3.124 -3.028 2.793 3.047 2.021 0.454 0.297 1.970 *** 0.301 -17.78 *** 0.308
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Pseudo R2
Correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the two equations
0.094 0.076
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 -0.319*** (standard error 0.006)
(III)                  







(IV)                     












(II)                     
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit          
(prior securitization law)
Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory variables
(I)                    













CONTROLLING FOR SPREAD ENDOGENEITY 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.286 *** 0.006 0.054 *** 0.004 -0.287 *** 0.006 0.057 *** 0.004
Fixed rate mortgage -0.284 *** 0.008 0.049 *** 0.006 -0.282 *** 0.008 0.047 *** 0.006
South and Islands 0.202 *** 0.006 -0.137 *** 0.005 0.203 *** 0.006 -0.148 *** 0.005
Female -0.131 *** 0.007 0.011 ** 0.005 -0.131 *** 0.007 0.012 ** 0.005
Close to bank headquarter -0.174 *** 0.009 -0.148 *** 0.006 -0.174 *** 0.009 -0.143 *** 0.006
Young (<40) 0.025 *** 0.006 0.099 *** 0.005 0.026 *** 0.006 0.098 *** 0.005
Joint mortgage -0.356 *** 0.006 0.151 *** 0.004 -0.355 *** 0.006 0.149 *** 0.004
Log of mortgage value 0.182 *** 0.006 0.188 *** 0.004 0.181 *** 0.006 0.195 *** 0.004
Emigrants 0.332 *** 0.005 0.078 *** 0.004 0.333 *** 0.005 0.072 *** 0.004
Liquidity ratio -0.092 0.103 -0.986 *** 0.078 -0.076 0.099 -1.080 *** 0.078
Excess capital to asset ratio 2.345 *** 0.223 -16.923 *** 0.223 2.742 *** 0.205 -17.009 *** 0.223
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Correlation coefficient between the 







(II)                     










(I)                     
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit             
(borrowers and bank characteristics)
Yes
(III)                     








 -0.305*** (standard error 0.004)








HIGH RISK TRANSFER: ALL SAMPLE 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Preferential mortgage -0.287 *** 0.006 -0.022 *** 0.005 -0.287 *** 0.006 -0.011 ** 0.005
Spread 0.002 0.001 -0.019 *** 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.020 *** 0.002
Fixed rate mortgage -0.290 *** 0.008 0.114 *** 0.006 -0.289 *** 0.008 0.121 *** 0.006
South and Islands 0.203 *** 0.006 -0.180 *** 0.005 0.204 *** 0.006 -0.173 *** 0.005
Female -0.131 *** 0.007 0.003 0.006 -0.131 *** 0.007 0.002 0.006
Close to bank headquarter -0.173 *** 0.009 -0.195 *** 0.007 -0.175 *** 0.009 -0.199 *** 0.007
Young (<40) 0.026 *** 0.006 0.078 *** 0.006 0.027 *** 0.006 0.082 *** 0.006
Joint mortgage -0.356 *** 0.006 0.130 *** 0.005 -0.355 *** 0.006 0.136 *** 0.005
Log of mortgage value 0.184 *** 0.006 0.137 *** 0.005 0.183 *** 0.006 0.134 *** 0.005
Emigrants 0.334 *** 0.005 0.068 *** 0.004 0.334 *** 0.005 0.070 *** 0.004
Liquidity ratio -0.625 *** 0.104 -0.368 *** 0.081 -0.477 *** 0.104 -0.280 *** 0.081
Excess capital to asset ratio 0.874 *** 0.210 -2.257 *** 0.192 1.145 *** 0.203 -2.060 *** 0.192
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the two equations
Dependent variable: 








(II)                     
Dependent variable: 
P(High risk transferi =1) 
Yes
(I)                     
 -0.263*** (standard error 0.005)
Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit             
(borrowers and bank characteristics)
Yes
(III)                     





P(High risk transferi =1) 
Yes Yes










 -0.267*** (standard error 0.004)
  
Table 12 
ONLY SECURITIZED LOANS: TEST FOR HIGH RISK TRANSFER MORTGAGES 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.162 *** 0.018 -0.101 *** 0.015 -0.165 *** 0.018 -0.093 *** 0.015
Spread 0.008 *** 0.003 -0.074 *** 0.009 0.008 *** 0.003 -0.069 *** 0.009
Fixed rate mortgage -0.233 *** 0.025 -0.361 *** 0.021 -0.225 *** 0.024 -0.456 *** 0.021
South and Islands 0.174 *** 0.023 -0.059 *** 0.013 0.171 *** 0.023 -0.014 0.013
Female -0.144 *** 0.021 -0.037 ** 0.015 -0.145 *** 0.021 -0.046 *** 0.015
Close to bank headquarter -0.209 *** 0.028 -0.263 *** 0.018 -0.208 *** 0.028 -0.294 *** 0.017
Young (<40) -0.096 *** 0.020 0.055 *** 0.015 -0.095 *** 0.020 0.048 *** 0.014
Joint mortgage -0.419 *** 0.017 0.127 *** 0.012 -0.417 *** 0.017 0.130 *** 0.012
Log of mortgage value 0.155 *** 0.022 -0.181 *** 0.016 0.157 *** 0.022 -0.159 *** 0.015
Emigrants 0.297 *** 0.015 0.093 *** 0.010 0.297 *** 0.015 0.103 *** 0.010
Liquidity ratio -1.746 *** 0.363 7.132 *** 0.319 -1.250 *** 0.350 7.770 *** 0.324
Excess capital to asset ratio 0.236 0.787 39.375 *** 0.866 0.853 0.759 41.650 *** 0.888
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the two equations
Dependent variable: 








(II)                     
Dependent variable: 
P(High risk transferi =1) 
Yes
(I)                     
 0.099*** (standard error 0.012)
Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit             
(borrowers and bank characteristics)
Yes
(III)                     





P(High risk transferi =1) 
Yes Yes










 0.099*** (standard error 0.012)
 
 Table 13 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.317 *** 0.096 0.474 *** 0.146 -0.330 *** 0.095 0.243 ** 0.105
Spread 0.005 0.004 -0.061 0.046 0.005 0.004 -0.112 *** 0.041
Fixed rate mortgage -0.126 0.086 -0.310 *** 0.077 -0.129 0.086 -0.344 *** 0.056
South and Islands 0.030 0.098 0.137 0.085 0.039 0.099 0.128 * 0.069
Female -0.093 0.093 0.095 0.113 -0.099 0.093 -0.041 0.091
Close to bank headquarter -0.230 ** 0.106 -0.213 0.153 -0.231 ** 0.105 -0.245 *** 0.093
Young (<40) 0.043 0.119 -0.088 0.157 0.045 0.119 -0.107 0.120
Joint mortgage -0.197 *** 0.070 0.320 *** 0.072 -0.198 *** 0.070 0.233 *** 0.059
Log of mortgage value 0.125 0.084 -0.661 *** 0.098 0.141 * 0.082 -0.583 *** 0.083
Emigrants 0.061 0.074 0.150 ** 0.062 0.053 0.074 0.150 *** 0.053
Liquidity ratio -1.274 1.245 -30.30 *** 2.925 -0.857 1.235 -29.26 *** 2.880
Excess capital to asset ratio 13.135 * 7.132 291.21 *** 22.316 16.353 ** 6.971 304.04 *** 23.640
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Correlation coefficient between the 




 0.147** (standard error 0.059)
Yes Yes
 0.134** (standard error 0.063)
1996-1999
8,164
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit             
(borrowers and bank characteristics)
Yes
(III)                     





P(High risk transferi =1) 
Yes Yes




 0.218** (standard error 0.056)





(II)                     
Dependent variable: 
P(High risk transferi =1) 
Yes
(I)                     
Dependent variable: 





ONLY SECURITIZED LOANS: TEST FOR HIGH RISK TRANSFER MORTGAGES 
MORTGAGES ORIGINATED PRIOR TO THE SECURITIZATION LAW 
 
  
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Dummy for not AAA rating 0.304 * 0.169 0.588 *** 0.193 0.627 *** 0.174
Retained securities in equity tranche (% of total) -0.006 ** 0.002 -0.006 ** 0.002
Total amount of past securitizations -0.112 ** 0.051
Constant 0.231 *** 0.037 0.255 *** 0.034 2.589 ** 1.057





      Between





(III)               
Dep. variable: spread on ABS securities in Senior tranche










SPREAD ON SENIOR TRANCHE ABS 
 
Table 14 
 Table 15 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.235 *** 0.011 0.063 *** 0.013 -0.215 *** 0.011 0.021 ** 0.009 -0.189 *** 0.011 0.143 *** 0.011
Spread 0.001 * 0.000 -0.016 *** 0.006 0.001 * 0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.001 * 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fixed rate mortgage -0.272 *** 0.016 -0.065 *** 0.015 -0.251 *** 0.018 0.144 *** 0.012 -0.207 *** 0.022 0.227 *** 0.015
South and Islands 0.228 *** 0.013 -0.123 *** 0.012 0.226 *** 0.014 -0.131 *** 0.011 0.229 *** 0.018 -0.156 *** 0.015
Female -0.121 *** 0.014 0.001 0.012 -0.112 *** 0.016 0.002 0.012 -0.075 *** 0.020 0.000 0.016
Close to bank headquarter -0.167 *** 0.019 0.145 *** 0.013 -0.132 *** 0.022 0.115 *** 0.013 -0.134 *** 0.027 -0.026 0.018
Young (<40) 0.090 *** 0.013 0.068 *** 0.012 0.089 *** 0.015 0.043 *** 0.011 0.093 *** 0.019 0.110 *** 0.015
Joint mortgage -0.249 *** 0.011 0.078 *** 0.011 -0.194 *** 0.013 0.058 *** 0.010 -0.152 *** 0.016 0.111 *** 0.013
Log of mortgage value 0.190 *** 0.012 -0.014 0.010 0.194 *** 0.013 0.427 *** 0.010 0.202 *** 0.016 0.250 *** 0.011
Emigrants 0.384 *** 0.009 0.104 *** 0.009 0.378 *** 0.011 0.070 *** 0.009 0.338 *** 0.014 0.088 *** 0.009
Liquidity ratio -0.804 *** 0.138 5.282 *** 0.095 -0.788 *** 0.161 1.522 *** 0.103 -0.827 *** 0.196 0.443 *** 0.135
Excess capital to asset ratio 0.415 * 0.246 4.400 *** 0.194 0.255 0.291 -4.633 *** 0.230 0.610 * 0.370 -8.731 *** 0.332
Bank fixed effects
Origination year dummies
Sample period for mortgages
No of observations
Correlation coefficient between the 




 -0.071** (standard error 0.011)
Yes Yes
 -0.207** (standard error 0.018)
1999-2006
272,233
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit             
(mortgages securitized at one year of age)
No
(III)                     
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit             




P(High risk transferi =1) 
No No
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit            
(mortgages securitized at two years of age)
Dependent variable: 
P(Defaulti=1) 
 -0.141*** (standard error 0.012)





(II)                     
Dependent variable: 
P(High risk transferi =1) 
No
(I)                     
Dependent variable: 











TWO STEPTREATMENT EFFECT MODELS 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
( A) Main equation. Dependent variable is the 
mortgage default dummy
Securitized -0.022 *** 0.003 -0.025 *** 0.003 -0.033 *** 0.003 -0.055 *** 0.019
Securitized*Equity tranche 0.045 ** 0.021 0.038 * 0.021 0.040 * 0.022 -0.073 0.068
Securitized*Equity tranche retained  -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.018
Securitized*ln(number of originating banks)  0.019 *** 0.002 0.018 *** 0.002 0.019 *** 0.002 0.083 *** 0.011
Securitized*Accounting value low 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.019 * 0.010 -0.052 0.047
Securitized*Investment grade  -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.011 0.010
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate -0.022 *** 0.001 -0.022 *** 0.001 -0.049 *** 0.004
Spread 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000
Fixed rate mortgage -0.022 *** 0.001 -0.022 *** 0.001 -0.027 *** 0.004
South and Islands 0.016 *** 0.001 0.016 *** 0.001 0.039 *** 0.005
Female -0.013 *** 0.001 -0.013 *** 0.001 0.001 0.005
Close to bank headquarter -0.014 *** 0.001 -0.014 *** 0.001 -0.014 *** 0.004
Young (<40) 0.002 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.012 * 0.006
Joint mortgage -0.030 *** 0.001 -0.030 *** 0.001 -0.019 *** 0.004
Log of mortgage value 0.017 *** 0.001 0.017 *** 0.001 0.052 *** 0.004
Emigrants 0.031 *** 0.001 0.031 *** 0.001 0.017 *** 0.004
Liquidity ratio -0.046 *** 0.011 -0.048 *** 0.011 0.162 0.184
Excess capital to asset ratio 0.089 *** 0.026 0.107 *** 0.026 -0.228 0.392
Origination year dummies
Bank fixed effects
(B) Selection equation. Dependent variable is 
the securitized mortgage dummy
Bank province -1.557 *** 0.133 -1.557 *** 0.081 -1.557 *** 0.081 -9.488 *** 0.957
Mortgage on preferential terms/rate 0.045 *** 0.005 0.045 *** 0.005 0.045 *** 0.005 -0.095 *** 0.035
Spread -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001 0.003 0.003
Fixed rate mortgage 0.045 *** 0.007 0.045 *** 0.007 0.045 *** 0.007 0.156 *** 0.029
South and Island -0.148 *** 0.006 -0.148 *** 0.006 -0.148 *** 0.006 -0.190 *** 0.036
Female 0.019 *** 0.007 0.019 *** 0.007 0.019 *** 0.007 0.053 0.038
Close to bank main seat -0.150 *** 0.008 -0.150 *** 0.008 -0.150 *** 0.008 -0.063 * 0.036
Young (<40) 0.089 *** 0.007 0.089 *** 0.007 0.089 *** 0.007 0.055 0.051
Joint mortgage 0.141 *** 0.006 0.141 *** 0.006 0.141 *** 0.006 0.111 *** 0.028
Log of mortgage value 0.194 *** 0.006 0.194 *** 0.006 0.194 *** 0.006 0.436 *** 0.030
Emigrants 0.071 *** 0.000 0.071 *** 0.005 0.071 *** 0.005 0.101 *** 0.029
Return on equity 0.027 0.185 0.027 *** 0.000 0.027 *** 0.000 0.094 ** 0.047
Bank Market Power -2.949 *** 0.014 -2.949 *** 0.134 -2.949 *** 0.134 41.318 *** 12.043
Liquidity ratio -1.046 *** 0.093 -1.046 *** 0.096 -1.046 *** 0.096 -45.604 *** 1.491
Excess capital to asset ratio -17.766 *** 0.232 -17.766 *** 0.246 -17.766 *** 0.246 -28.764 *** 2.234
Origination year dummies
Bank fixed effects





Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
1,107,951 1,107,951
(IV) Contract, borrower 
and bank characteristics 
(prior to securitization 
law)               





characteristics          






(I) Contract, borrower 
and bank characteristics  
(II) Contract and 
borrower characteristics  
Treatment-effects model,  
two-step estimates






Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Figure 1
SECURITIZED LENDING IN ITALY BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
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Source: Bank of Italy. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. (1) The dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. 
  
Figure 3
DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGE AT DEFAULT 
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